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tion (Initiates Joint Attention, or IJA) bids, and that an attenuation
of positive affective sharing plays a role in joint attention impair-
ment in autism (Kasari et al. 1990; Mundy et al. 1992). If positive
affect is indicative of motivation, these observations are consistent
with the hypotheses that social motivation plays a role in the de-
velopment of sharing intentions with others (Tomasello et al.’s ar-
ticle) and the neurodevelopmental impairment of joint attention
in autism (Mundy 1995). Frontal processes involved in motivation
(i.e., associating rewards with goal-directed activity) have also
been associated with infant IJA development (Dawson et al. 2002a;
Nichols et al., 2005).Moreover, there is a shift from reactive affect
in IJA (smiling after looking from an object to a social partner) to
anticipatory affect (smiling at the object and then conveying the
affect to the social partner) between 8 and 10 months (Venezia et
al. 2004). This may indicate an important change in the integra-
tion of affect, cognition, and intentional control in the early de-
velopment of intention sharing. Thus, current research offers
some support for the social-motivation hypothesis of intention
sharing. However, the fundamental nature of the motivation pro-
cesses involved remains to be described.
Tomasello et al. also suggest that the capacity to monitor and
regulate goal-directed actions, and to represent the goals of self
and other, provides a cognitive foundation for sharing intentions.
Neurodevelopmental research and theory ascribe similar cogni-
tive functions to triadic joint attention (Mundy 1995, 2003). The
ability to follow gaze and respond to the triadic joint attention bids
of others (Responds to Joint Attention, or RJA) is associated with
temporal and parietal cortical functions serving attention disen-
gagement, orienting, and social perception (e.g., see Mundy et al.
2000; Vaughan & Mundy, in press). For example, primate studies
indicate that the superior temporal sulcus (STS) contributes to the
processing of gaze direction versus the processing of the direction
and orientation of limb movements (e.g., see Perrett et al. 1992).
However, a subset of limb movement cells appears to be modu-
lated by activity of the gaze-following system (Jallema et al. 2000).
Thus, the combined analysis of direction of visual attention and
body movements of others by STS systems provides an important
source of information that gives rise to the capacity to detect in-
tentionality in others (Jallema et al. 2000).
IJA may be associated with the dorsal-medial frontal cortex and
anterior cingulate complex (DMFC/AC [Caplan et al. 1992; Hen-
derson et al. 2002; Mundy 2003; Mundy et al. 2000]). The DMFC/
AC contributes to the planning, self-initiation, and self-monitor-
ing of goal-directed behaviors, including visual orienting (e.g., see
Rothbart et al. 1994) and the capacity to share attention across
dual tasks, or representations (Stuss et al. 1995). Thus, the
DMFC/AC plays a critical role in the maintenance of representa-
tions of self, a social partner, and third object/event that is critical
to the capacity to share intentions (Mundy 2003; Mundy et al.
2000). The DMFC/AC is also be involved in the motivational me-
diation of goal-related behavior. The DMFC/AC plays a critical
role in the supervisory attention system (SAS) (Norman & Shal-
lice 1986), which functions to guide attention deployment and be-
havior, depending on the motivational context of the task (e.g., see
Buch et al. 2000).
Ultimately, the DMFC/AC is involved in representing the self,
and self-monitoring of goal-related behavior, as well switching at-
tention between internal proprioceptive (self information) and ex-
teroceptive information about external events (e.g., see Craik et
al. 1999; Faw 2003; Mundy 2003).
Frith and Frith (2001) argue that the DMFC/AC integrates
self-monitored information with perceptions processed by the
STS about the goal-directed behaviors and emotions of others.
This putative facility for integrating proprioceptive “self” infor-
mation with exteroceptive “other” information has been called a
social executive function (SEF) of the DMFC/AC (Mundy 2003),
and a breakdown of this SEF may play a role in joint attention and
social-cognitive impairment in autism (Mundy et al. 1993). Theo-
retically, the DMFC/AC facility to compare and integrate the ac-
tions of self and others contributes to the capacity for simulation
(Stich & Nichols 1992) and the ability to infer the intentions of
others by matching them with representations of self-initiated ac-
tions (Mundy 2003). Once this integration begins, a fully func-
tional, adaptive human social-cognitive system emerges with ex-
perience (Frith & Frith 2001). Indeed, there is evidence that
DMFC/AC activity is associated with social-cognitive perfor-
mance on theory-of-mind measures in adults (e.g., see Calarge et
al. 2003). Thus, understanding of intentions in others may be an
emergent property of the gradual phylogenetic and ontogenetic
development of a myriad of integrated functions of the human
DMFC/AC and temporal cortical systems.
Of particular importance here may be the development of the
comprehensive DMFC/AC capacity for self-monitoring and self-
regulation of goal states. From a constructivist perspective, infants
need to self-monitor and self-regulate (exercise control of) their
own goal-directed behaviors and emotions in order to understand
goal-directed, intentional action in others (Mundy 2003; Tomsello
et al.). Thus, in addition to motivation and representational abil-
ity, the constructs of self-awareness and self-regulation may be im-
portant to consider in theory on triadic joint attention and the 
capacity to understand intentions in others. Supporting this con-
jecture, self-recognition (self-awareness) has been associated with
infant IJA development (Nichols et al., 2005), and 6-month RJA
predicts self-regulation during delay of gratification in 2-year-olds
(Morales et al., 2005). Infant IJA and RJA are also associated with
behavior and emotion regulation among 30- to 36-month-olds
(Sheinkopf et al. 2004; Vaughan et al., submitted), and infants ex-
posed to less optimal caregiving associated with dysregulated be-
havior display attenuated IJA development (e.g., see Claussen et
al. 2002).
These observations are quite consistent with the insights of
Tomasello et al. and point to a persuasive convergence of per-
spectives on the human capacity to share experience with others.
They also suggest that self-awareness and self-regulatory pro-
cesses may be neurodevelopmentally bundled with social-motiva-
tion and social-cognitive processes in both the phyologenetic and
ontogenetic development of the capacity to share experience, as
well as in the resultant human capacity for cultural cognition.
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Abstract: Evidence for infants’ sensitivity to behavior being goal oriented
leaves it open as to whether they see such behavior as being designed to
lead to an external goal or whether they see it, in addition, as being di-
rected by an internal representation of the goal. We point out the difficulty
of finding possible criteria for how infants or children view this matter.
Organisms can be described as having goals even when they do
not have an explicit representation of the goal-to-be-achieved that
directs behavior. For example, some plants turn towards light,
which McFarland (1989) described, therefore, as goal-seeking.
Tomasello et al.’s exemplary thermostat can recognize a goal when
it obtains, so can be described as goal-achieving.
Tomasello et al. recognize the importance of such distinctions
by pointing out that much confusion resulted from failure to
clearly distinguish the external goal (a potential future state of the
environment) and the internal goal (a behavior-guiding mental
representation of the external goal). Instead, Tomasello et al. de-
cide to use “goal” simpliciter for internal goal and “desired result”
for external goal. Unfortunately, this decision can only aggravate
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conceptual confusion. When technical definitions go against nat-
ural meaning, as in this case, readers tend to fall back into natural
language meaning. Even the authors appear to do so. For exam-
ple, in section 2.2 they write, “[I]nfants understand . . . actors rou-
tinely go around obstacles to get to goals” (our emphasis). This
certainly can’t mean according to their definition that “infants un-
derstand actors go around obstacles to get to their internal repre-
sentations of their desired results.”
Tomasello et al.’s definition of goal is, however, not just an un-
fortunate technical use of language but misleads in substance by
suggesting without argument or evidence that infants understand
purposive behavior as guided by internal representations of goals.
When reviewing infants’ understanding of the pursuit of goals in
section 2.2, the authors routinely describe infants as seeing ob-
served behavior as “goal-directed action,” which, according to
their definition would be phrased “action directed by the internal
representation of a goal.” Their descriptions thus entail that in-
fants understand goals as internally represented without giving
any reason or evidence for such a claim.
Such reasons would be particularly valuable because of the im-
portance of the distinction in question. We know of no obvious
way of determining whether children see behavior as goal-di-
rected (directed by an internal representation of a goal) in dis-
tinction to seeing behavior as goal-oriented, without assuming an
internal representation of the goal.
The relevant contrast is between teleological explanations and
intentional or mentalistic explanations. A completely externalist
(no internal states involved) teleological explanation sees behav-
ior as a function of the present state of the world (circumstances),
some future state (goal) and rudimentary rationality – that is, that
behavior will occur that transforms reality into the goal state. This
externalist view also applies to inanimate objects without internal,
behavior-directing states, like a pendulum whose goal is to come
to rest at the lowest possible point (according to Aristotle [Kuhn
1977]).
An externalist view also provides limited understanding of “in-
telligent” mechanisms like temperature-regulating systems. Know-
ing the external temperature and the system’s target temperature
(external goal) enables prediction of whether the system will
switch the furnace off (behavior). Ways of manipulating the sys-
tem intelligently remain limited to changing the external circum-
stances (e.g., to heat up the room). Other intelligent means of in-
tervention become possible only if we understand more of the
internal workings.
According to an internalist view of intelligent behavior, the sys-
tem/organism’s behavior does not depend directly on the state of
the world and some future goal state but on internal representa-
tions of these states. Here we need to distinguish two levels of un-
derstanding. In the case of the thermostat, we have full physio-
logical understanding of the internal parts of the thermostat
(bimetallic strip that bends when heated and touches a contact
point, etc.) and their functional role (bimetallic strip curvature
represents external temperature, contact-point setting represents
goal, etc.). At the level of folk psychology (theory of mind, men-
talism), however, we have no understanding of the actual internal
parts; we only surmise that there must be some part registering
the external temperature (belief), another part representing the
goal value (desire), and a comparison mechanism that takes action
when the two values coincide (practical reasoning mechanism).
Nevertheless, we gain an advantage over the purely externalist
approach in two ways:
1. Intentionality. We can understand that the system repre-
sents the external circumstance in a particular way, which depends
among other things on the information the system has. Given mis-
information it will misrepresent the circumstances (false belief).
Its subsequent behavior can then be predicted or explained, in a
way not possible with a purely externalist account.
2. Manipulability. Understanding that the internal representa-
tion of external circumstances depends on information enables a
novel means of manipulating the system’s behavior. We can make
it delay switching on the furnace by deception – that is, by heat-
ing up its sensors to make it “believe” the room is still hot.
Children’s understanding that beliefs are internally represented
has been assessed by their ability to predict, explain, or induce
false beliefs. Can similar techniques be used for testing under-
standing goals as internally represented? Curiously, there is no
straightforward analogy to false belief, because goal representa-
tions do not depend on manipulable ingoing information, and
goals cannot be misrepresented. If the thermostat represents the
goal as 31C, then that is the system’s goal, even though people
might prefer 21C. In other words, the (external) goal is deter-
mined by its internal representation (direction of fit [Anscombe
1957; Searle 1983]), whereas, for beliefs, the external circum-
stance is not determined by what the system believes it to be.
A tempting line of thought is that understanding subjective
preference requires an understanding of internal representation
of goals, because subjectivity smacks of Intentionality. Indeed, in-
fants in their second year (Repacholi and Gopnik 1997) under-
stand that someone else can want broccoli, which the children
themselves find revolting. However, a difference in goals can be
understood without understanding goals as internally represented
(see Perner et al., 2005). The infants simply understand that one
of this (admittedly strange) person’s external goals is to eat broc-
coli.
In conclusion, seductive choice of terminology can suggest that
infants take an internalist, mental view of goals, but we find it dif-
ficult to specify hard criteria for determining when they actually
do take such a view.
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Abstract: Tomasello et al. have presented a position that is grounded in a
conservative perspective of cultural learning, as well as in a rich interpre-
tation of recent findings in early social cognition. Although I applaud their
theoretical framework, I argue that data from studies of human infants are
not necessarily consistent with the developmental picture that they de-
scribe.
Approximately one decade ago, Tomasello et al. (1993) brought
forth the argument that human beings’ understanding of con-
specifics as intentional or mental agents is a species-unique abil-
ity that renders humans capable of participating in cumulative cul-
tural evolution. In their present thought-provoking article,
Tomasello et al. draw on a wealth of recent research regarding the
cognitive capacities of nonhuman primates and human infants as
a means of revisiting the issue of cultural cognition. The authors
conclude that nonhuman primates have a greater understanding
of intentional agents than was previously believed. Furthermore,
they maintain that the crucial difference between human cogni-
tion and that of other species centers on the ability to participate
in activities involving joint intentions and attention or what they
refer to as shared intentionality. They propose that the ontogeny
of the ability for collaborative engagement occurs in three stages
over the first year of human life as a joint product of the under-
standing of intentional action (also found in other apes) and the
motivation to share psychological states (species specific). It is ev-
ident that Tomasello et al. are well placed to provide an evolu-
tionary account of human cognition, seeing as they occupy a
unique niche in the field of cognitive science. Indeed, a substan-
tial portion of the published research on social cognition in human
and nonhuman primates over the last decade can be attributed to
them. In the following commentary, I address three principle is-
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